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Campbell: Resistance and Meaning: Religious Communities and Human Cloning

Religious, Philosophical, and
Ethical Perspectives on Cloning
RESISTANCE AND MEANING: RELIGIOUS
COMMUNITIES AND HUMAN CLONING
COURTNEY S. CAMPBELL

I. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of announcements that scientists had successfully cloned a large
mammal, the sheep "Dolly," from a somatic cell from an adult ewe, President
Clinton requested that the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC)
deliberate and offer recommendations on federal policy on the cloning of human
beings. In his mandate to the NBAC, President Clinton commented that "any
discovery that touches upon human creation is not simply a matter of scientific
inquiry, it is a matter of morality and spirituality as well."' This is to say that
informed public discourse on human cloning must accommodate fundamental
religious values and convictions embedded in scientific research on life's
beginnings.
Many social commentators and political interest groups expressed surprise
and/or concern that the NBAC's deliberations would incorporate religious
considerations, in addition to scientific, philosophical, and legal perspectives,
into the policy debate over the cloning of human beings. Yet, public policy
commissions at the federal level that have addressed biomedical ethics have
commonly examined and elicited theological issues and the views of religious
traditions. While these religious perspectives cannot be the foundation for public
policy, the NBAC and its predecessor commissions have correctly acknowledged
that religious communities embody traditions of moral wisdom that continue to
shape and guide the moral views of many members of the public who are also
citizens in a democratic society. Moreover, the Western religious traditions
have provided a core of moral beliefs, such as the sanctity of human life, and
the dignity and equality of persons, that have become deeply embedded in our
* Ph.D., The University of Virginia, 1988; Assbciate Professor and Director, Program for
Ethics, Science, and the Environment, Department of Philosophy, Oregon State University.
1. Marlene Cimons & Jonathan Peterson, Funding for Human Cloning Banned, THE
OREGONIAN, Mar. 5, 1997, at Al.
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culture, even if these values now may be explicated and justified on nonreligious grounds. 2 The historical embedding of cultural values within religious
traditions is one example of the possibility for what the philosopher John Rawls
has described as the "overlapping consensus" on moral values in our society.'
This Article will examine and critique the religious values and theological
arguments on cloning human beings presented to the NBAC and in the scholarly
literature. My analysis will begin with a brief historical overview of religious
ethical reflection on the cloning of humans. I will then proceed to consider the
arguments offered in the current controversy over human cloning, using the
themes of "resistance" and "meaning" that are central to Yale law professor
Stephen Carter's interpretation of the moral role of religious communities in a
liberal democratic society. 4 Such themes provide an important framework for
understanding and evaluating religious and theological convictions and
conclusions on cloning human beings.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

While the advent of mammalian cloning using adult somatic cells has rightly
been perceived as a new threshold in scientific inquiry, this has not been
unanticipated in theological and religious scholarship. Indeed, it is possible to
identify four overlapping time frames in which theologians and religious thinkers
have examined the scientific prospects and ethics of human cloning. The first
phase of consideration occurred in the mid-1960s. This discussion was shaped
by a context of expanded choices and the control over reproduction (e.g.,
availability of oral contraception), the prospects on the medical horizon of
technologically assisted reproduction (e.g., research on in vitro fertilization), and
advocacy by prominent biologists and geneticists of cloning "preferred"
genotypes to avoid overloading the human gene pool with deleterious genes that
eventually could risk the survival of the human species.5
Among prominent theologians who engaged in these initial discussions of
reproductive and genetic manipulation and human cloning with scientific and
philosophical interlocutors were Charles Curran, Bernard Haring, Richard
McCormick, and Karl Rahner within Roman Catholicism, and Joseph Fletcher
and Paul Ramsey within Protestantism. I will here briefly review the positions

2. James F. Childress, The Challenges of Public Ethics: Reflections on NBAC's Report,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 9-11.
3. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:Politicalnot Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 22526 (1985).
4. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 23-43 (1993).
5. Joshua Lederberg, Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution, AM. NATURALIST, Sept.Oct. 1966, at 519-31.
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and their
of the latter two, as they staked out diametrically opposed positions
6
visions of the current controversy were remarkably prescient.
Fletcher, a theologian in the Episcopal tradition, advocated expansion of
human freedom or autonomy and control over human reproduction, consistent
with a theological understanding that rational capacities should domesticate
nature. Fletcher portrayed human cloning as one among a panoply of present
and prospective reproductive options that could be ethically justified under
circumstances of over'riding societal benefit.
Not only did Fletcher not
recognize any distinctive moral boundary between procreation through sexual
intercourse and technologically assisted reproduction, but Fletcher singled out
human cloning as a preferable method of reproduction relative to the "genetic
roulette" of intercourse. Laboratory reproduction was "radically human"
because it was deliberate, designed, chosen, and willed, that is, it reflected
precisely those characteristics central to the rational domestication of nature.7
In contrast, Paul Ramsey, a Methodist theologian, portrayed human cloning
as a "borderline" or moral boundary for medicine and society, the crossing of
which would compromise human dignity and the meaning of procreation. This
was consistent with a theological vision in which human beings were to exercise
responsible stewardship within the limits of finitude and mortality, that is, limits
of nature as designed by God. Ramsey expressed concern about three
"horizontal" (person-person) boundary crossings represented by the prospects
of human cloning. First, clonal reproduction in service of the scientific ends of
a controlled gene pool would violate freedom by requiring dictated or managed
breeding. Second, cloning would violate what Ramsey held to be the "cardinal
canon of loyalty" in medical relationships-the requirement of informed
consent-through non-therapeutic research on human embryos and fetuses.
Third, cloning represented an assault on the meaning and purposes of sexuality
and parenthood. Cloning would radically sever the unitive and procreative ends
of sexual intercourse; contraception had made it possible to have sex without
babies; cloning would facilitate babies without sex. Moreover, Ramsey sought
to resist the technological transformation of "procreation" into "reproduction."
The child of the procreative union was an embodied symbol of the couple's
mutual love and a gift of their intimacy; the child of technology was, by
contrast, a "product" of human will and design. 8

6. Allen D. Verhey, Cloning: Revisiting an Old Debate, 4 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 227-34
(1994).
7. JOSEPH F. FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL: ENDING REPRODUCTIVE
ROULETE (1974).
8. Paul Ramsey, Moral and Religious Implications of Genetic Control, in GENETICS AND THE
FUTURE OF MAN 107-69 (John D. Roslansky ed., 1966).
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In addition to these horizontal boundary crossings, Ramsey also articulated
two "vertical" (person-God) instances of trespass into the forbidden. Cloning
exemplified the theological original sin of pride or hubris; human beings who,
having experienced god-likeness through the knowledge of good and evil, could
now aspire to a form of immortality through science. In addition, cloning could
satisfy the misguided desire for self-creation and creation of one's progeny in
one's own image. In both of these instances, human beings fell victim to the
wrong of "playing God." On Ramsey's account, "Men ought not to play God
before they have learned to be men, and when they have learned to be men, they
will not play God." 9
The legacy of these two thinkers on subsequent theological and
philosophical discussion of bioethics, especially in the realms of reproductive
choices and genetic controls, cannot be overstated. Fletcher and Ramsey
established the broad moral parameters for bioethical discourse on cloning
human beings. While the catalyst for the initial theological appraisal of cloning,
the scientific concern to ensure a genetically healthy species, has diminished,
Fletcher's advocacy of reproductive autonomy and the use of technology to tame
nature for rational human ends has been perpetuated in continued scientific and
biomedical research to alleviate infertility. This ideology has been, by and
large, the moral route that biomedical culture has followed to bring us to the
threshold of human cloning. Yet, Ramsey's reservations have not gone
unheeded and, to some extent, have been confirmed in the cloning controversy.
For example, the fact that only 1 of 277 somatic cell clones survived to birth in
the Scottish sheep research has heightened moral concerns that human cloning
inevitably will pose risks to the unborn child. Indeed, the potential for harm to
a child from the cloning process was the single norm invoked by the NBAC in
recommending legislation that would prohibit human cloning until such time as
the process could satisfactorily meet standards of safety.'"
A second distinctive phase of religious consideration was initiated in the late
1970s, and is especially demarcated by 1978, wherein two notable events
occurred: the birth of Louise Brown, the first child conceived through in vitro
fertilization (IVF), and the publication of In His Image, an account alleging to
report the creation of the first human clone."' The immediacy and reality of
IVF led Jewish and Christian thinkers to concentrate discussion on the religious

9. PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHics OF GENETIC CONTROL 138 (1970); cf. id.

at 60-103.
10. Childress, supra note 2, at 9-11.
11.

DAVID RORVIK, IN His IMAGE: THE CLONING OF A MAN (1978).
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and ethical issues presented by this revolutionary event in human reproduction,
and diverted attention away from human cloning, which seemed ever further in
the future after scientists determined that the cloning account was fabricated. 2
Nonetheless, leading Jewish scholars, such as Seymour Seigel and Fred
Rosner, began to articulate a more moderate perspective on human cloning than
offered by Fletcher or Ramsey. Jewish thought did not present the "either/or"
of the Christian theologians, but offered a "both-and" approach. In Jewish
thought, human freedom is not unlimited, and persons are accountable for their
moral choices. However, the Jewish scholars also emphasized human dominion
over nature, in partnership with God, for the healing of disease and disability
and the general betterment of human welfare. These themes did not lead to a
decisive affirmation or indictment of human cloning, but rather to a call for
considered and extensive discussion of cloning within the Jewish community."3
The "both-and" character of Jewish thought on human cloning continues in
current discussion, as reflected in the testimony of Jewish thinkers before the
NBAC. Although procreation through intercourse is religiously preferable,
Jewish thought recognizes that special circumstances, such as the preservation
of lineage or the relief of infertility, may make the cloning of human beings a
permissible act as a last resort (though not a routine medical practice). 4
The second phase also witnessed the initiation of formal ecclesiastical
involvement with questions of reproductive technology, genetic engineering, and
human cloning. The United Church of Christ, a mainstream Protestant
denomination, produced a study booklet on genetic manipulation that appears to
be the earliest reference among Protestant denominational literature to human
cloning. The booklet provided a general overview of the science and ethics of
human cloning; but, consistent with the denomination's tradition of respect for
personal conscience, the booklet did not come to a normative theological
assessment.1 5 Protestant-coordinated bodies, such as the World Council of
Churches and National Council of Churches of Christ, as well as some specific
denominations, issued resolutions or position-statements giving cautious
endorsement to genetic interventions for therapeutic purposes. 6 Meanwhile,
Evangelical Christians, having been politically mobilized by the legalization of
abortion in Roe v. Wade, initiated discussion of bioethical issues, including
human cloning, among their religious communities and seminaries. Not
surprisingly, evangelical commentary situated human cloning in the broad scope
of the right-to-life controversy: cloning was itself deemed a threat to the core

12. William J. Broad, Court Affirms: Boy Clone Saga Is a Hoax, ScI., July 3, 1981, at 118-19.
13. See JEWISH BIoETHIcs (Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979).
14. Elliot N. Dorff, Human Cloning:A Jewish Perspective, BIOLAW, June 1997, at S 118-25.
15. BARRY LYNN, GENETIC MANIPULATION (1977).

16. See ON THE NEW FRONTIERS OF GENETICS AND RELIGION (J. Robert Nelson ed., 1994).
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value of the sanctity of human life because of the anticipated loss of embryonic
life in cloning research and reflected societal disregard for life's sanctity through
efforts, crystallized in the abortion issue, to re-define human life and
personhood 7
The blastomere separation of human embryos reported by researchers at
George Washington University in the fall of 1993 initiated a third phase of
religious discussion. This research project was performed on embryos with a
genetic anomaly that would have precluded any attempts at gestation and
birth.'" It nonetheless evoked a vigorous repudiation frorh the Roman Catholic
tradition. In 1987, the Vatican had issued an encyclical entitled Donum Vitae
(Instructionon Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of
Procreation), expressing moral opposition (and encouraging policy opposition)
to techniques of reproductive technology that deliberately severed the procreative
and unitive ends of sexuality, including donor insemination, IVF, surrogacy, and
experimentation on embryos produced through IVF procedures. Donum Vitae
also rejected human cloning (blastomere separation) both as a scientific outcome
and as a scientific proposal. As it stated, "attempts or hypotheses for obtaining
a human being without any connection with sexuality through 'twin fission,'
cloning or parthenogenesis are to be considered contrary to the moral law, since
they are in opposition to the dignity both of human procreation and of the
conjugal union."19
Although Roman Catholic theologians had throughout the prior quartercentury argued against human cloning, Donum Vitae added an emphatic
ecclesiastical resource by which Catholic scholars evaluated the embryo cloning
at George Washington University. Richard McCormick, a renowned Jesuit
theologian, maintained that cloning would impose irreparable harm to "our
cherished sense of the sanctity, wholeness, and individuality of human life."2'
While proponents of cloning research appealed to autonomy, both in the sense
of freedom of scientific inquiry and of control over reproductive choices,
McCormick argued that the cumulative effect of the ideology of sovereignty of
freedom and choice could issue in social support for eugenics. Persons will not
have intrinsic dignity qua person, but rather will be valued (or devalued) in
terms of the particular genetic characteristics they were designed to have. Thus,

17. J. KERBY ANDERSON, GENETIC ENGINEERING (1982).

18. Gina Kolata, Cloning of Human Embryos: Debate Erupts over Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 1993, at Al, C3.
19. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN
LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION Pt. I 6 (1987).

20. Richard A. McCormick, Should We Clone Humans? Wholeness. Individuality, Reverence,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 17, 1993, at 1148-49; Richard A. McCormick, Blastomere Separation:

Some Concerns, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 14-16.
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cloning cannot but erode respect for pre-nascent human life and of respect for
persons with genetic anomalies (not necessarily "diseases") who were not
engineered or cloned for a desired trait. In so doing, we will instead socially
engineer a culture intolerant of diversity and individuality.
The fourth and current stage of religious discussion on human cloning has,
with the success of somatic cell nuclear transfer in the "Dolly" research, 2 been
permeated with a stronger sense of scientific reality and immediacy. Society has
also witnessed the pluralism that is characteristic of this culture's religiosity.
While Roman Catholic and conservative Protestant commentary has reiterated
concerns about human dignity, parenting, and procreation, other Protestant
thinkers have drawn on models of human partnership with ongoing divine
creative activity to express qualified support for cloning research and human
cloning.22
Jewish and Islamic thinkers, while expressing deep moral
reservations about human cloning as a practice or option for prospective parents
in the way that Joseph Fletcher proposed, have nonetheless contemplated
scenarios within which acts of cloning could be ethically acceptable.'
It is this religious pluralism on human cloning, and its supporting normative
values, that the remaining part of this essay seeks to elucidate. It will be useful,
however, to identify some insights generated by this brief historical overview.
First, a sustained theological engagement with the issue of human cloning
has been ongoing for the past thirty years. This is attributable in part to the
deep questions of human nature, purpose, and destiny at the core of religious
reflection that the prospects for human cloning raise anew. This history of
theological examination, moreover, anticipates and illuminates much
contemporary discussion.
Second, no uniform, unified religious perspective on human cloning exists.
Religious traditions invoke different norms, stories, images, and analogies to
interpret human cloning and arrive at different conclusions in the evaluation of
cloning.

21. Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385
NATURE 810-13 (1997).
22. Philip Hefner, Cloning as Quintessential Human Act, INSIGHTS, June 1997, at 1-2.
23. Dorff, supra note 14; Maher Hathout, Cloning Humans: Who Will Set the Limits?,
MINARET, Mar. 1997, at 25.
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Third, contrary to the views of some commentators,24 religious
communities and traditions of ethical reflection experience internal tensions and
contradictions and moral assessments of cloning. Religious traditions seldom
"abolish hard ethical positions" by absolutist declarations of principle. At their
best, principled reflections of religious traditions are informed by and modified
by human experience.
Fourth, despite changes in scientific context, research, and technical
capability, the values that underlie religious understandings and concerns about
cloning human beings have displayed durability and continuity. They been
generated from within the moral frameworks of religious communities, but have
helped to inform public consciousness and debate. This raises issues about the
moral significance of religious communities in the policymaking processes of
liberal democratic societies.
III. POLITICAL ECCLESIOLOGY
The political relevance of religious communities in a liberal democratic
polity continues to be a subject of much controversy. Political theorists seek to
acknowledge the influential role of religious convictions for religious adherents,
while holding these convictions to a standard of "publically accessible" reasons
for inclusion in democratic discourse. Within this context, the perspective of
Stephen Carter, as articulated in The Culture of Disbelief,' provides a
framework for interpreting and assessing religious commentary on the cloning
of human beings.
Carter relies substantially on the insights of Alexis de Tocqueville, who
described voluntary associations and intermediate communities, including
religious traditions, as vital to a vibrant democratic society. Religious traditions
enable mediation between the values of the self and the interests of the state.
In this respect, Carter affirms the role of religious communities as "independent
moral voices" in a pluralistic society. They are "independent" from state
authority, thus avoiding religious establishment, but also providing a basis for
political and social critique. Such communities are also independent from more
narrowly-defined special interest groups in society, who may often seek to
appropriate religious language and symbols to achieve particular political goals.
Finally, religious communities are constituted by internal normative practices
whose validity may be assessed with respect to how faithfully they reflect and

24. R.C. Lewontin, The Confision over Cloning, THE N.Y. REV., Oct. 23, 1997, at 18-22
(reviewing NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION (1997) [hereinafter

NBAC REPORT]).
25. CARTER, supra note 4.
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eohere with the formative moral values of the religious tradition, which have
been developed and articulated independent of secular norms and
26
perspectives.
In these respects, Carter contends, religious communities are politically
relevant as "autonomous communities of resistance and independent sources of
meaning."27 They are communities that can and should "resist" the moral
authority of social institutions, e.g., political, scientific, or economic. Their
traditions of moral reflection can also infuse substantive meaning into not only
the lives of community members, but also into civic discourse, which may
otherwise be deflated due to a focus on procedural issues. The traditions can
display what ultimately is at stake in the resolution of moral controversy on one
side or another.
In analyzing religious issues concerning the cloning of human beings, I rely
on the twin themes of "resistance" and "meaning" that Carter identified. They
provide a constructive framework by which to explicate what is morally at stake
in scientific inquiry on human cloning.
IV.

THEMES OF RESISTANCE

Five major themes of "resistance" are identifiable in religious interpretation
of cloning human beings. These themes include: (1) the technological
imperative; (2) the transformation of procreation; (3) the culture of choice; (4)
the constriction of policy discourse; and (5) the compartmentalization of
citizenship. These themes do not predispose a permissive, regulatory, or
prohibitory conclusion on cloning, although collectively they may work to shift
the burden of moral and policy proof from the demonstration of immediate and
tangible harms by the opponents of cloning to the advocates of cloning, who
would be required to demonstrate the substantial benefits, the minimization of
risks, and the equitable distribution of the benefits and burdens of cloning human
beings.
A. Resistance of the Technological Imperative
The technological imperative refers to the overriding of moral claims or
religious convictions on the grounds that if the technology is available, it must
or should be used. Currently, of course, the technology to clone a human being
is not known to be developed, but scientific and biomedical research is bringing
this threshold ever closer. If the technology is developed, the imperative holds

26. Id. at 35-43.
27. Id. at 40.
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that society will then find itself having recourse to cloning technology regardless
of individual or collective benefits or harms.
Religious values do not support resistance to technology per se. Instead,
they affirm support of technology insofar as it is justified and limited by human
ends. In religious traditions, the primary human end toward which medicine and
biomedical technology ought to be directed is that of "healing," of seeking to
"make whole" persons and their communities. Thus, the core religious
questions regarding cloning technology concerns what human ends are furthered
or served by the technology and the extent to which cloning facilitates human
healing.
By contrast, the technology to clone human beings reflects the reductionistic
spirit characteristic of scientific inquiry in general. Human biological nature is
reduced to the makeup of a somatic cell; human relational identity becomes
conditioned by genetic bonds. While traditions of spirituality have generally
presupposed that human beings are more than the sum of the parts of their
biological being, cloning technology begins with the smallest human biological
organism and leaves open the issue of the extent to which personal identity is
merely the enacting out of genetically-coded behaviors. In short, cloning
technology presumes the human self to be infinitely malleable and brings all
realms of human identity and sociality within the scope of technical
manipulation. Thus, to the religious question posed above, the response
embedded in the arguments of advocates of cloning human beings is that the
notion of human ends must be fluid and elastic, as cloning will work to re-frame
and re-conceptualize what it means to be "humans." Indeed, it will perhaps
relieve society of these conditions that, as one character in a novel by C.S.
Lewis puts it, most offend human dignity: birth, breeding, and death.2"
The redefinition of humanity and human dignity cannot but be seen as
theologically problematic. Like the Luddites of the 19th century who resisted
the inroads of the Industrial revolution on the grounds that industrialization
destroyed "commonality, "29 religious resistance may be directed against a
specific technology, such as cloning, that seems to call into question common
patterns and ways of life, or that transforms the human condition and meanings
foundational to human dignity.
In addition to resistance of the technological imperative based on
considerations of human ends, the common good, and dignity, other religious
objections may be raised on grounds of justice and exploitation. Members of

28.

C.S. LEWIS, THAT HIDEOUS STRENGTH 174 (1946).

29. KIRKPATRICK SALE, REBELS AGAINST THE FUTURE (1995).
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indigenous and eastern religious traditions, for example, see in the scientific
drive to pursue the cloning of human beings a profound skewing of social
priorities and values. Native American scholars find it immoral that social
resources may be directed to facilitate cloning technology when native peoples,
with the lowest life expectancy of any demographic group, are already deprived
of access to basic primary care, as well as maternal and neonatal care. Scholars
from eastern religious traditions, while not objecting to cloning per se,
nonetheless see cloning as a diversion from the primary pursuit of life, the
achievement of self-knowledge and actualization. Cloning presents another
manifestation of western society's attempt to gain insight into metaphysical
questions through technological means. 33
The African-American religious response, meanwhile, raises an additional
justice objection to cloning: the prospect of disproportionate impact and
exploitation.
This must be interpreted against the background of the
community's generalized distrust of the biomedical research enterprise, itself
attributable to a long-standing misuse and victimization of African-Americans
at the hand of research medicine. It remains to be seen whether the use of
cloning technology would facilitate a healing and trusting relationship between
medicine and this marginalized religious community, or whether it might
encourage study of illnesses of specific concern to African-Americans, such as
3
sickle-cell disease. 1
B. Resisting Transformed Procreation
As illustrated in the historical overview, a long-standing concern of
religious thinkers about cloning human beings is its impact on the human
significance and meaning of procreation. While all agree that cloning promises
a transformation in meaning, for some, this is a transformation to be celebrated;
for others, one to be resisted. Here I will focus on the motivations for
resistance.

-30. Courtney S. Campbell, Examination of Views of Religious Traditions on Issues of the
Cloning of Humans 40-49, 56-59 (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission, on file with author).
31. See Marian Gray Secundy, Can Science Be Trusted?, REFLECTIONS (Program for Ethics,
Sci. & the Env't, Oregon State University), May 1997, at 5; see also Kenneth S. Robinson,
Regulating Cloning Technologies, RnmcIONS (Program for Ethics, Sci. & the Env't, Oregon State
University), May 1997, at 5-6.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 [1998], Art. 9

618

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Many religious thinkers affirm a moral ideal of how children are to be
brought into the world, namely, through the intimacy and sexual union of
procreation in a committed relationship. The child so conceived and created
becomes a "gift," a profound symbol of love, mutuality in relationships, an
experience with "otherness," and sign of God's creative intention."
Moreover, parenting is a practice that requires deep moral commitments
and character, neither of which may be present when parenting is mediated by
legal and contractual concerns. The parents' relational identity to the child is
not sufficiently captured by the ties of genetic relationships. The social and, for
females, gestational binding of parent to child are our most significant moral
relationships and constitute adults' most important obligations. While it is
ppssible to be a parent without biological or genetic ties (e.g., adoption), it is
not possible to be a parent with only these ties.
Cloning seems to rearrange the priority of these relationships, by stressing
the genetic contributions to a child's formation. Moreover, insofar as a child
is conceived through intention and deliberate human design, facilitated by the
artifice of technology, procreation appears transformed into re-product-ion, that
is, the language of the child as "gift" gives way to that of "product." This shift
in discourse raises the prospect of the kind of impersonal and mechanistic
processes of reproduction that early opponents to cloning human beings foresaw.
An important response can and should be directed at this religious critique
of cloning. Arguments similar to those above could be made regarding virtually
all other forms of assisted reproductive technology, including donor
insemination, IVF, and surrogate pregnancy. As noted above, the Roman
Catholic tradition in Donum Vitae treats all these categories of reproduction as
morally similar because they violate the child's right to be born as the fruit of
the conjugal union. However, many other religious traditions accept the
legitimacy of these technologies in certain circumstances. Because ethics
requires us to treat similar cases similarly, the question for religious resistance
to transforming procreation is whether it is possible to draw a distinction
between cloning and other reproductive technologies already accepted as
legitimate. If not, then the religious objections distinctively directed against
cloning human beings seem to lose their force.
32. See Gilbert Meilaender, Remarks on Human Cloning to the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, BIOLAW, June 1997, at S114-18; Dorff, supra note 14.
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Religious commentators on cloning have seemed to presuppose such a
distinction in describing the possibility of a clone as a genuine "revolution" in
history or as "unprecedented" in the history of human reproduction. 3
However, the content of this distinction has proved very elusive and difficult to
delineate. One can conclude, however, by indicating that cloning provides for
society, as well as religious traditions, an opportunity to give meaningful
consideration to the significance we attribute to procreation and parenthood.
C. Resisting the Culture of Choice
Whatever control human beings have over procreation and reproduction,
this is not, from religious viewpoints, an unlimited and absolute dominion.
Rather, an understanding that processes of reason-giving constrain human
choices limits the dominion of control over procreation and reproduction. Such
processes presuppose the values of accountability, mutual respect, and public
justification. However, these moral requirements are absent in the world of
reproductive medicine. For example, infertility clinics are not subject to public
oversight or regulation; clinical practice (and success) may vary considerably
between clinical settings. The ethical integrity of policies and informed
decision-making depends on voluntary compliance with guidelines developed by
professional organizations, rather than accountability before independently
constituted ethics committees. These features explain why President Clinton
could ask only for the good-faith adherence of the reproductive medical
community to his initial moratorium on efforts to clone human beings.
In addition to this clinical autonomy, philosopher Daniel Callahan has
observed that individual choice and personal autonomy govern the ethical
decision-making of clients and the theoretical justification of client options. The
operative ethic of reproductive medicine is that "anything goes" to such an
extent that concern for the best interests of the child is simply lost. Indeed,
[n]owhere has anyone suggested that cloning would advance the
cause of children ....
But it has been one of the enduring failures of
the reproductive rights movement that it has, in the pursuit of parental
discretion and relief of infertility, constantly disassociated the needs of
children and the desires of would-be parents.'

33. See Lisa Sowle Cahill, Hearingson Cloning: Religion-Based Perspectives, BIOLAW, June
1997, at S100-03.
34. Daniel Callahan, Cloning: The Work Not Done, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1997,
at 18, 19.
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Thus, a culture of choice reigns in reproductive medicine, with its moral
logic increasingly influenced by an economic paradigm that sees medicine's job
as satisfaction of consumer preferences. It becomes difficult in this setting to
make any credible ethical judgments. The language of parental "desire" or
"preference" suggests that requests to have a boy rather than a girl through
reproductive technology carry the same moral significance as a preference for
vanilla rather than pistachio ice cream. Put another way, there are no criteria
internal to the practice of assisted reproductive techniques to enable a distinction
between a legal right to choose on the part of prospective parents and a morally
right choice.
Religious resistance to this culture of choice characteristically takes the
following pattern. While few theological ethicists are willing to recommend an
outright prohibition on the cloning of human beings, most tend to argue that its
clinical application be limited to a very restricted set of compelling
circumstances (saving a life, continuing a family line) as a last resort. This
seeks to draw a line against the culture of choice based on a distinction between
"acts" and "practices." Uses of cloning would be limited to well-defined
indications rather than being offered to clients as yet another option in the
panoply of assisted reproductive options. In this regard, it is important to
indicate that no contemporary theological ethicist has expressed any willingness
to follow the position of Joseph Fletcher and permit cloning as a generally
available option for infertile couples or as a preferred mode of human
reproduction.
D. Resisting Constricted Policy Discourse
Two core moral principles, autonomy and utility, structure the public
hearings held by and the report issued by the NBAC on the ethics of cloning
human beings.' Appeals to autonomy were especially evident in claims about
the overriding importance of scientific freedom to pursue promising research
directions and about the rights of prospective parents to procreative liberty. The
principle of utility was embedded in discourse that sought to weigh and balance
possible benefits to parents, infertility specialists, biomedical researchers, and
society in general against potential risks to children or harms to other interested
parties. In short, the essence of the policy questions turned on: (1) whether
risks or harms could be identified, (2) whether these outweighed the promise of
benefits, and if so, (3) whether the magnitude and probability of the risks or
harm were so serious as to justify restricting scientific and procreative
autonomy.

35. See Courtney S. Campbell, Prophecy and Policy, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1997,
at 15-17; NBAC REPORT, supra note 24, at 1-10.
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The NBAC came to a consensus that restrictions by way of a temporary
moratorium could be justified on the grounds of protecting children. Should
ongoing research on cloning over the next five years diminish the risks of harm
from the cloning process, the grounds for restriction would no longer hold, and
cloning would be regulated as per any other legitimate medical procedure rather
than continuing to be restricted.
Regarding this policy process, the question for traditions of religious
reflection was whether the policy framework of autonomy and utility was really
sufficient to address the ethical issues presented by cloning. Such principles
appear to many religious thinkers to reflect a constricted and ever-contracting
realm of policy discourse, and one that negates any substantive consideration to
religious perspectives. Religious arguments sought to expand the discussion by
focusing on issues of the "common good," distributive justice, and symbolic
harm. In so doing, such arguments attempted to shift the burden of proof for
purposes of fashioning policy from those who sought to impose restrictions on
proceeding with cloning to those who would permit cloning, under some form
of regulatory oversight.
The religious arguments raised questions about the desirability of placing
the burden of proof upon positions advocating restrictions or prohibitions of
cloning. In the first instance, duties to prevent the infliction of harm on others
are much more stringent than duties to benefit others as a matter of general
social morality. Thus, it would seem that the case for benefits must be much
more compelling than the case for harms. As one theologian argued before the
NBAC, the moral primacy of non-harm over beneficence means that "strong
evidence of positive benefits" must exist before proceeding with cloning.'
Second, if the burden remains on the showing of harm, it becomes virtually
an impossible case to prove. In the nature of the case, the demonstration of
immediate and tangible harm can be established only by permitting cloning to
proceed. Erik Parens has expressed the point this way:
How, after all, does one prove to those not already in the choir that
such harms [degrading quality of parenting and objectifying children]
will occur? How does one measure their magnitude? Friends and
foes of such worries have to appreciate how difficult it is to make
public policy in light of claims that are so difficult to demonstrate and
37
so easy to disprove.

36. Nancy J.Duff, Theological Reflections on Human Cloning, BIOLAW, June 1997, at S10613.
37. Erik Parens, ToolsfromandforDemocraticDeliberations,HASTINGS CTR.REP., Sept.-Oct.
1997, at 20, 22.
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In advance of either research or actual cloning attempts, however, concerns
about harm can be (and were in testimony before the NBAC) considered
.speculative" and thus relevant but less decisive for policy than promised
benefits. In addition, risks of harm that are long-term and intangible or
symbolic (e.g., the impact of cloning on the symbol of a child as "gift") receive
minimal policy consideration in this framework of autonomy and utility.
The German sociologist Max Weber discussed two forms of rationality,
"instrumental rationality" and "expressive rationality," which summarize the
policy clash over the burden of proof and the constriction of policy discourse
that it typifies.3" The secular arguments that appeal to autonomy and utility are
representative of what Weber designates "instrumental rationality." That is,
they see acts and policies as instruments to the achievement of certain ends.
The central questions in policy deliberations concern the most effective and
efficient means to achieve these ends. The ends themselves, however, are
immune from moral and policy scrutiny or, as suggested previously, may be
redefined by the nature of the technological project. As Weber contends,
Whether life is worth living and when-this question is not asked by
medicine. Natural science gives us an answer to the question of what
we must do if we wish to master life technically. It leaves quite aside,
or assumes for its purposes, whether we should and do wish to master
39
life technically and whether it ultimately makes sense to do so.
By contrast, a second set of arguments, including but not limited to
religious arguments, is characteristic of Weber's "expressive rationality." Such
claims view acts and policies not primarily in terms of the goals they achieve,
but rather with reference to the values they express about persons, their
practices, and their communities. Expressive rationality also subsumes moral
and social scrutiny of desired ends as part of ethically responsible life and
citizenship.
In its policy deliberations over cloning human beings, the NBAC clearly
gave primacy to the arguments and positions of instrumental rationality. This
diminishes the policy relevance of the values embedded in expressive rationality,
and the ends affirmed or critiqued by those values. In many circumstances,
moreover, the arguments made by religious traditions display expressive rather
than instrumental rationality. It remains an open question whether society is
well served by exclusive reliance on instrumental forms of rationality in policy38. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77128 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958).
39. Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS INSOCIOLOGY 129,
144 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958).
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making, but there is little question that such reliance impoverishes public and
policy discourse.
E. Resisting Compartmentalized Citizenship
Liberal democratic political theory emphasizes reasons that are accessible
to the general public as a criteria for inclusion in democratic discourse. This
may impose a burden of "translating" religious convictions from their original
context of a religious community for, as in the case of the NBAC, an audience
of appointed commissioners representing the diversity of American culture and
paths of life. This burden manifests itself in what I designate as the "informed
citizen" standard of information intelligibility. That is, arguments that are
rooted in religious premises or values must be able to articulate their claims or
positions in language accessible and comprehensible to a citizen generally
informed about the scientific and social implications of cloning. In general, in
the case of the NBAC cloning hearings, scientists who discussed cloning
research or philosophers who presented ethical arguments using secular language
were not held to this standard of accessibility and understanding. This occurred
even though much of the scientific testimony was very technical in nature and
some philosophical claims presupposed epistemological assumptions no less
inaccessible than comparable religious perspectives.
In this respect, a question may be raised about the extent to which a person
with religious convictions can submit these to the crucible of public discourse
as a citizen. One prominent theorist, for example, has advocated a posture of
citizen "non-reliance" on religious convictions in forums of public policy.'
This seems to suggest that a religious believer must either withdraw from civic
discourse or become a citizen without convictions to participate. In either case,
a person's claim to the rights of citizenship seems compartmentalized and their
integrity to their deepest convictions potentially compromised.
At one level, this is not an unreasonable request. If, as in the cloning
debate by the NBAC, restrictions on scientific, personal, or procreative freedom
are contemplated, it is not satisfactory to reply to an inquiry about the rationale
for imposing limits on liberty: "because my religious convictions do not permit
the exercise of your freedom." However, it is important to distinguish appeals
to religious convictions as a warrantfor a specific policy from the roles of such
convictions in political discourse or the policy process. While the former
represents a form of religious tyranny or authoritarianism, citizens' claims to
freedom of expression and religious liberty clearly permit the latter, theories of
non-reliance notwithstanding.

40. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 49-84 (1988).
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Arguments on cloning that appeal to explicitly religious norms should
thereby be subjected to the same standards for inclusion and exclusion in civic
discourse as non-religious arguments. These standards include tolerance and
mutual respect. The success of a religious-based position will thereby depend
on the efficacy of persuasion rather than coercion, and persuasion will in turn
depend on the extent to which such an argument resonates with values already
accepted by the society or embedded in its practices. For this reason, religious
thinkers may find it more prudent to present an intelligible translation of their
claims for public discourse, even if some important religious content gets lost
in the translation. This does not mean such translations are required, however,
nor that explicit theological arguments should not receive a public hearing. It
does suggest, however, that the competing claims of citizenship and conviction
can in most cases be successfully negotiated.
Section IV has focused on themes of religious "resistance" in the public
debate over cloning human beings. It is important to consider such issues
because one important test of a public policy in terms of its political feasibility
is "the nature, extent, and depth of opposition to those policies by various
religious and secular communities."'" However, religious communities not only
present resistance, but can infuse meaning into the practices and beliefs of the
general society. The next Section will examine themes of meaning presented by
religious thinkers in the context of cloning.
V.

THEMES OF MEANING

Religious discourse on the cloning of human beings has invoked several
issues of meaning that are at the core of religious life and philosophical inquiry.
The term "meaning" here refers to the ultimate questions of human experience,
including our origins, nature, and destiny; our response to powers beyond our
control, such as the genetic lottery of life; our finitude and fallibility; the
character of the good society; and our mortality. These are questions toward
which the liberal state assumes a posture of neutrality, for they raise profound
metaphysical issues over which persons and communities have deeply different
understandings. In order to maintain a cohesive and relatively peaceful social
order, the liberal society is agnostic on these issues about the good life for
human beings.
Yet, these questions become unavoidable if we are to approach the
prospects of human cloning with theological seriousness and philosophical rigor.
This Section examines three claims of meaning that have been particularly
important in perspectives of religious reflection on cloning: (1) the moral

41. Childress, supra note 2, at 11.
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viability of intermediate communities; (2) a narrative understanding of human
life; and (3) human nature as creative. I do not claim that there is a univocal
religious interpretation on these themes; indeed, as my analysis will illustrate,
these are issues in which there is disagreement within and between religious
traditions. However, this should be taken as an indication that, even if no
consensus on the answers presented by the religious traditions exists, the
questions they pose are really unavoidable in ethical and policy debates on
cloning.
A. The Moral Viability of Intermediate Communities
Much of the policy and philosophical discussion over cloning human beings
has proceeded on an assumption that the primary stakeholders are individuals or
couples and the authoritarian state. Thus, as portrayed above, the moral
question of cloning tends to get framed as an issue of what, if any, restrictions
on liberty (scientific or procreative) are permissible. What is omitted from this
construction of the question is the moral significance of intermediate
communities, which, after all, are the context for most of our meaningful life
experiences. It is. through these intermediate communities, such as family,
friendships, religious communities, and professional associations, that the
relationship between the autonomous citizen and the authoritarian state is socially
enacted and that values are transmitted and mediated. Moreover, they provide
the most genuine, and most difficult, test of the integrity of our moral character,
because our ethical convictions are always on display in these intimate and
proximate relationships. These intermediate communities thus have their own
identity and integrity that influence how a question of social ethics and policy
is framed and resolved.
Within these contexts, religious voices in the cloning debate have given
particular attention to the moral meaning or value of a child and the primacy of
familial relationships. The availability of reproductive technologies of various
kinds and the prospects of human clones tend to make the child a human project,
or as expressed by legal scholar John Robertson, a matter of "choice."42 By
contrast, religious argumentation stresses the sentiments of awe and wonder
evoked by the embodied child. A child is thus understood as a "gift" and a
'mystery" rather than an artifact of human choice and design. The language of
"gift" situates the child within our general social conventions and discourse
about "gifts," that is, as entities that convey and embody personalization, foster

42. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (1994).
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mutuality and community, and encourage reciprocity. Gifts thereby represent
a form of human exchange that cannot be reduced merely to market forces.4 3
In this context of the child as "gift" rather than "product," cloning may be
problematic to the extent that it risks eroding the value we attribute to a child,
or those sentiments that a child evokes in society in general, and within parents
in particular. It is important to keep in mind that the entity of scientific interest
in the cloning process is the (somatic) cell and the processes of cellular division,
and the child-to-be who is the outcome of the process may be of secondary
interest. Scientific and philosophical arguments in support of cloning have
tended to emphasize the benefits of basic knowledge to researchers, or to
potential treatments for human diseases, or to parents. Yet, as Callahan
pointedly observes, "children in our world do not suffer from an absence of
cloning. ""
Of course, the understanding of the value of a child shapes and forms the
context of familial relationships. In one sense, many religious arguments on
cloning human beings express concern about parenting situations where the child
is the result of a calculated benefit-risk analysis to the parents, or the product
of an unlimited right to reproductive autonomy, rather than the symbol of
parental love. Parenting involves profound moral commitments to preserving,
nurturing, receptivity, and mutuality that are not adequately accommodated by
moral frameworks of utility or autonomy. Moreover, some religious traditions,
particularly Judaism and Islam, give prominence to the importance of
generational integrity and moral responsibilities that are rooted in genealogical
lineage. This suggests a deep commitment to the kinds of ties that bind families
together, as spouses, as parents, and as generations, and in turn why some
theologians ultimately reject the prospects of human cloning on the grounds of
"a good life in a family." 45
The stability of family is not a sufficient moral perspective by which to
evaluate human cloning, but it is a necessary context within religious
frameworks, and an indication of the extent to which intermediate communities
are given serious consideration in democratic discourse. Islamic thought, for
example, affirms that, because the family is intrinsic to a well-functioning
society, cloning procedures that separate the spiritual and moral relations of
spouses, and those of parents and children, may undermine the foundation for
43. See Paul F. Camenisch, Gift and Gratitude in Ethics, J. OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Spring
1981, at 1-34. See also Thomas H. Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Apr. 1987, at 30-38.
44. Callahan, supra note 34, at 19.
45. Allen D. Verhey, Theology After Dolly: Cloning and the Human Family, CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, Mar. 19-26, 1997, at 285-86.
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human community in general. ' It is not a compelling counterargument to
contend that social realities of familial life and relationships do not match
theological idealism about the "good life in a family," because the political and
philosophical framework of citizen and state as the primary moral relationship
is itself a distortion of ordinary moral experience.
B. The Narrative Context
Religious arguments infuse a realm of meaning into debates on cloning by
situating cloning within their formative narratives. Religious narratives are
embedded within and express "mythic" dimensions of religious experience.
Here "myth" is used not in the sense of a fabrication, but rather in a more
academic sense of a story that functions in several ways: (1) it communicates
a world-view or vision; (2) it is revelatory for self-understanding; (3) it
sanctions models of behavior and moral norms; and (4) it offers explanations for
the eruption of evil or harm and the need for liberation.47
In this respect, it is perhaps no surprise that much of the discussion in
religious communities about moral issues in general are given a narrative
context. Moral norms are embedded in narratives, for example, the norm of
neighbor love in the Christian parable of the Good Samaritan" and the norm
of non-attachment in the Buddhist parable of the mustard seed ."9 In the context
of cloning, in which researchers, parents, and policymakers contemplate the
creation of new life, religious traditions, whether western, non-western, or
indigenous, situate cloning within formative narratives of creation. 0
In the Jewish and Christian traditions, religious arguments about cloning
rely heavily on the creation story related in Genesis. This story establishes a
particular view of self-understanding that is crucial to Jewish and Christian
ethics on cloning, namely, that human beings are created in the "image of God"
(imago Dei). The imago Dei provides insights into both researchers who
develop cloning processes, for example, and human selves as imaginative and
creative, as well as the nature and value of the clone, where disagreements
surface in religious arguments over whether the clone reflects the imago Dei or
is rather a creation after the image of human beings, more particularly of man,
and thus perhaps not authentically human. Religious traditions may differ over

46. Abdulaziz Sachedina, Islamic Perspectives on Cloning, BIOLAw, June 1997, at S127-30.
47. JAMES C. LIVINGSTON, ANATOMY OF THE SACRED 79-90 (1989).
48. Luke 10:25-37.
49. E.A. BuRrr, TEACHINGS OF THE COMPASSIONATE BUDDHA 44-45 (1955).

50. See generally Human Cloning: Fact, Fiction, and Faith, REFLECTIONS (Joan Woolfrey &
Courmey S. Campbell eds., Program for Ethics, Sci. & the Env't, Oregon State University), May
1997, at 1.
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the meaning of the imago Dei or in its application to the context of cloning
human beings, but this claim about self-identity and understanding is a
fundamental conviction of theological anthropology that cannot be neglected.
And these convictions presuppose a background narrative and vision of the
world.
Moreover, the narrative sanctions certain forms of behavior as acceptable
based on moral norms. However, religious traditions may differ over which
aspect of the narrative is morally normative. Christian thinkers, for example,
tend to draw heavily on the first creation story of Genesis 1, in which male and
female are created in the image of God. This provides a basis for normative
judgments regarding sexual differentiation and procreation. When applied to the
context of cloning, a common concern is the normative connection between the
unitive and procreative purposes of sexuality, which is ruptured by cloning (as
well as by many other forms of reproductive technology and contraception). The
norm does not generate a definitive ethical assessment of cloning, but it does
impose a presumption against cloning as a reproductive method to create a child.
By contrast, Jewish scholars in the cloning debate tend to draw more
frequently on the second creation story related in Genesis 2, in which human
beings are given "dominion" over creation and a mandate of partnership with
God to improve human life. 5 Thus, the Jewish tradition is less likely to come
to a judgment that cloning violates anything intrinsic in human dignity; instead,
the Jewish tradition focuses on whether and to what extent cloning research and
cloning human beings may improve human welfare. Jewish scholars are
generally more supportive of cloning research than they are of cloning a human
being, because a better understanding of cellular division and embryonic
development may provide the basis for progress against various kinds of
diseases. However, no Jewish thinker seems willing to preclude the latter as a
possibility in every and all situations. If cloning is the only recourse for A
parent that seeks to have a child with at least partial genetic ties, or to continue
a genealogical lineage, such circumstances may justify cloning a human under
the norm of improving human welfare.
Theological narratives are thus a basis through which moral discourse about
cloning may be infused with a substantive depth and meaning. When such
narratives are invoked in public discourse, they serve the function of stimulating
public imagination. They can enable moral perception by illuminating how
cloning raises profound questions of human origins and human identity.
Although I have focused here on the ways that different religious traditions may
interpret a narrative tradition differently, and thus come to different moral

51.

Dorff, supra note 14.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss2/9

Campbell: Resistance and Meaning: Religious Communities and Human Cloning

1998] RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES & HUMAN CLONING 629
judgments about cloning human beings, it is important to keep in mind two
themes that seem to be shared across religious traditions. First, cloning is
theologically contextualized within myths and narratives of creation or human
beginnings.
Second, religious discourse about cloning does not invoke
narratives of redemption or liberation. This is to say that, while cloning may
be viewed as an alternative way of bringing a child into the world, it is at best
a morally optional procedure, rather than morally required. Nonetheless, some
religious thinkers understand cloning within narratives of eschatology or human
destiny, as an expression of an evolving human nature.
C. Human Destiny
Even for religious traditions that embed cloning in narratives of creation,
a question remains about whether creation is normative. Do human beings "look
backward" for our moral guidance, hoping to respect the image of God in
persons and, culturally, to regain or approximate a paradise lost? This
perspective of a "closed" human nature is certainly central to arguments
presented by many religious thinkers, and by and large, it leads to negative
theological assessments of the ethics of cloning.
However, another theological interpretation is possible, one that emphasizes
an "openness" about human destiny. This perspective begins from the insight
that part of what it means for human beings to be created in the image of God
is precisely to be creative, and to express that creativity in their interactions with
other persons, with nature, and through the use of various technologies. This
understanding is implicit in the more flexible stance on human cloning
represented in Jewish thinkers that was noted above, wherein humanity is given
a mandate to repair or mend creation. The human gaze is thereby redirected
from a backward look to a forward vision, in which creation is understood not
as static and fixed at a particular time, but as a dynamic process, within which
normative humanity and human destiny evolves over time and is continually recreated. Creation is an ongoing process, a continual creation (continuo creatio)
to which human beings are called to active participation. Such an account, which
has emerged in more liberal Protestant thought,52 can accommodate, permit,
or even encourage cloning of human beings as an expression of human creativity
to the extent that the procedure promotes human welfare and dignity.
The problem with this account is that, in its attempt to emphasize
theological openness to creativity and technological innovation, it does not seem
to offer any basis for limitations. After all, if normative humanity is undergoing

52. See TED PETERS, PLAYING GOD? GENErIc DETERMINISM AND HUMAN FREEDOM (1997);
see also RONALD COLE-TURNER, THE NEW GENESIS: THEOLOGY AND THE GENETIC REVOLUTION

(1993).
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continual re-creation and interpretation, then the concepts of "human welfare"
or "human dignity" are themselves rendered theologically problematic. The
theological emphasis on a creative human destiny, while avoiding a static
standard of the normatively human, does not seem to be able to generate any
viable standard in its place.
While such positions thus encourage human participation in creativity, and
even co-creatorship with the divine, they have nonetheless wanted to maintain
that human beings are created co-creators. That is, projects of our creativity
and imagination, including technological innovations, are subject to the
constraints of finitude and fallibility. We have limited capacities to predict or
control the outcomes of courses of action that we initiate, and it is difficult (and
,some would argue impossible) for us to be morally disinterested in these actions
to the point of being able to offer valid ethical assessments.
Secular,
theological, and popular literature are replete with examples of where creativity
was not balanced with or checked by awareness of fimitude and the possibilities
of fallibility: almost every cultural tradition, including modem science, has its
versions of the Promethean myth. If our human propensities for aspiration and
pretension are dismissed, then stories from Genesis or from literature such as
Frankenstein, Brave New World, or JurassicPark remind us that what is created
can ultimately rebel and consume the creator with catastrophic consequences.
In this respect, religious narratives of eschatology and theologies of human
destiny do incorporate some features of normative humanity as limits on our
creative projects, including proposals for cloning human beings.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to display both points of contact and conflict
between religious ethical traditions and public policy in the debates over the
cloning of human beings. It is an important challenge for public policy to
accommodate the breadth of religious pluralism in our culture and to formulate
similar standards of policy relevance for religious and non-religious positions.
Religious traditions, as independent moral voices in society, can contribute to
policy debates through the articulation of themes of resistance and meaning, but
insofar as possible, religious thinkers should seek to express these themes in a
discourse that an informed citizenry can generally access.
In the policy process, religious ethical traditions are vital resources for a
liberal democratic society whose public imagination often seems incapacitated
and whose public discourse seems contracted. In the context of the debate over
cloning human beings, an emphasis on themes of resistance and meaning can
enhance moral perception and "problem-seeing," that is, traditions of religious
ethics offer alternative contexts or narratives within which the controversy may
be framed. This enables religious discourse to be incorporated within the policy
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process without being explicitly invoked as the warrant for a particular policy,
an important goal not only for the secular state, but for religious communities
who seek to retain their moral independence and integrity.
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